The value of contractual terms in office leases by Sheehan, Kevin T. (Kevin Thomas)
 1
The Value of Contractual Terms in Office Leases 
 
by 
 
Kevin T. Sheehan 
 
B.S.E. Civil Engineering, Princeton University, 1997 
J.D., University of Virginia, 2000 
 
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ARCHITECTURE IN PARTIAL 
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT 
AT THE 
MASSACHUSSETS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
SEPTEMBER 2006 
 
 
© 2006 Kevin T. Sheehan.  All Rights Reserved 
 
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce 
and to distribute publicly paper and electronic 
copies of this thesis document in whole or in part 
in any medium now known or hereafter created. 
 
 
 
 
Signature of Author:             
Department of Architecture 
July 28, 2006 
 
 
Certified by:              
Henry O. Pollakowski 
Principal Research Associate 
Center for Real Estate 
 
Accepted by:              
David Geltner 
Chairman, Interdepartmental Degree Program in Real Estate Development 
 2
The Value of Contractual Terms in Office Leases 
 
by 
 
Kevin T. Sheehan 
 
Submitted to the Department of Architecture 
on July 28, 2006 in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in 
Real Estate Development 
Abstract 
This paper uses a comprehensive data set to develop a hedonic model of office rent that 
estimates values of contractual terms such as tenant improvement allowances, leasing 
commissions, and options.  The model includes variables to control for building characteristics 
and market conditions, as well as basic lease terms.  Although other studies have used a similar 
approach, the prior work in this area was limited by the lack of data regarding contractual terms. 
The results show that there is a consistent, upward-sloping, convex term structure of rent.  
Furthermore, there is an insignificant “size premium” but the “proportion discount” is 
significant.  In general, other variables, such as location variables and qualitative variables 
behave as expected, with the exception of the expense type dummy variables. 
Tenant improvement allowances and leasing commissions paid by the landlord do not have a 
predictable impact on rent at low levels.  But high levels of allowances and commissions result 
in significant rent premiums.  These results indicate that lower levels of allowances and 
commissions may be expected by the market.  At higher levels, however, these contractual terms 
are clearly priced into rent levels. 
Renewal options appear to have positive impacts in some years and negative impacts in other 
years.  Renewal options may represent amenities that are granted to tenants as inducements in 
weaker leasing markets but are priced in stronger markets.  Termination options and rights of 
first offer/refusal appear to have negative impacts on rent that are somewhat consistent in all 
years.  This is counterintuitive because these options are thought to benefit the tenant.  One 
explanation is that these options are in fact beneficial to the landlord. 
Further study is necessary to understand the value of these options.  Overall, more information 
about options terms would be beneficial.  Information such as the renewal rent, the termination 
fee, and the size of the offer/refusal space would help us to understand the economic 
arrangement between the parties and to predict the corresponding impact on rent. 
Thesis Supervisor: Henry O. Pollakowski 
Title: Principal Research Associate, Center for Real Estate 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Background 
Commercial office leases are intensely negotiated between landlord and tenant.  Thousands of 
dollars in fees to attorneys, brokers, and consultants may be spent by both parties.  The logical 
conclusion is that contractual terms in office leases must have some value. 
The basic contractual terms include lease length and the amount of leased space.  The prior 
literature has studied these basic terms, in addition to other determinants, such as building 
characteristics and market conditions.  Some of the prior studies have included even more detail, 
such as expense structures and base rent escalation clauses. 
Certain contractual terms, however, have not been studied.  Some of these terms appear to 
have obvious economic consequences.  For example, tenant improvement allowances are 
common in office leases.  These provisions require the landlord to fund all or a portion of the 
build out of the leased space.  Leasing commissions are another common contractual term.  
These commissions are payments to third parties, which may constitute a significant percentage 
of the value of the lease. 
Both tenant improvement allowances and leasing commissions are upfront costs paid by the 
landlord.  But how do these costs affect rent levels?  Are higher upfront costs balanced out by 
increased future cash flow from rent, or are these terms treated as concessions that are awarded 
to desirable tenants or when the leasing market is weak? 
Other interesting provisions that may have some economic value include the various types of 
lease options.  Options are generally held by the tenant, but may be held by the landlord in some 
cases.  Options come in many different varieties, but the basic option types can be categorized as 
renewal, termination, expansion and reduction options.  In addition, rights of first offer and rights 
of first refusal represent other forms of option rights.  Each of these option types may present 
unique issues to both the tenant and the landlord.  Some options may be commonly negotiated 
and others may appear less frequently. 
Options theory teaches that lease options have some positive value to the option holder.  But 
do rent levels reflect this value?  Are options treated as concessions?  Or does the inclusion of 
certain option types indicate the existence of a particular negotiation dynamic or a special 
situation on the part of either the landlord or the tenant? 
Literature Review 
There has been a limited amount of research that applies hedonic analysis to office rents.  
Furthermore, many of the prior studies are constrained by a lack of data, especially with regard 
to contractual provisions, including economic terms such as concessions, allowances, and 
commissions, as well as lease options. 
Wheaton and Torto (1994) use a data set that includes approximately 60,000 leases negotiated 
between 1979 and 1991, in 50 metropolitan areas.  “Consideration rent” is the dependent 
variable.  Consideration rent is the average (undiscounted) gross payment per square foot to be 
paid over the full term of the lease.  This measure includes free rent and specified rent steps and 
percentage escalations, but does not include CPI adjustments or the cost of tenant improvements. 
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First, Wheaton and Torto use a semi-log form to estimate the hedonic equation within each 
metro area.  The regression variables include square feet of lease, length of lease in years, and 
dummy variables for building height, building newness, and built to suit leases.  In addition, 
dummy variables are created for expense types, years, and submarkets. 
Second, Wheaton and Torto use the hedonic rent index to estimate equilibrium market rents 
based on vacancy and space absorption.  Wheaton and Torto conclude that movements in the 
calculated indices are very consistent with theories about rent, vacancy and commercial leasing.  
The conclusion notes that periodic re-estimation of the hedonic rent equation based on new 
historical data is necessary to update the indices. 
This paper is based on the approach in the first part of Wheaton and Torto.  In addition to that 
study, other hedonic models of office rent have been developed using various measures of rent as 
the dependent variable and incorporating more or less detail with regard to lease, building, and 
market-specific information. 
Brennan et al. (1984) focus on the Chicago CBD office market.  This study develops a hedonic 
model that explains the variation in office rent per square foot.  Brennan et al. determine that the 
log-linear form is the best regression model.  This study includes explanatory variables at the 
lease level such as “loss factor” and vertical location, as well as building characteristics and 
location terms.  The model explains more than 90% of the variation in the log of rent; however, 
the sample size is very small and is limited to a single market. 
Glasscock et al. (1990) provide an empirical analysis of office building rents using data from a 
sample of office buildings in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, over a five-year period.  The results of 
this study indicate that rent levels respond to the various factors in the expected manner.  The 
dependent variable is average real rent per square foot for each building in each year.  This study 
also examines the rent-vacancy adjustment process over time. 
Benjamin et al. (1992) examine the choice between rent contracts with and without relocation 
provisions and the impact of relocation provisions on office rents.  This study uses a switching 
simultaneous-equations model, with the choice of relocation rights (not rent levels) as the 
dependent variable.  Benjamin et al. conclude that rents and certain other lease terms are 
important determinants of the choice of relocation rights, but tenant characteristics such as size 
and creditworthiness have only a marginal effect. 
Mills (1992) presents a statistical analysis of 1990 office asking rents in the Chicago 
metropolitan area.  A variety of amenities were included in the hedonic model, along with 
building characteristics and location variables.  The model also included dummy variables to 
indicate the presence of certain lease terms.  This study concludes that location variables are 
especially important, and that the use of first-year asking rent as the dependent variable produces 
regression results that are similar to the output based on net present value measures. 
Bollinger, et al. (1998) estimate hedonic office rent models using quoted annual rental rates 
per square foot for a sample of buildings located in Atlanta from 1990 to 1996.  This study 
controls for building characteristics and lease terms, in an effort to evaluate the impact of 
location variables such as wage rates, transport rates, and proximity to concentrations of of 
support services and office workers.  Bollinger, et al. conclude that these location measures 
explain some of the spatial variation in office rent. 
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Colwell et al. (1998) apply hedonic analysis to Chicago area properties that sold from 1986 to 
1993.  This study estimates a transactions-based index based on sales prices rather than rents.  
Colwell et al. note that many of the prior office market studies have used imperfect measures of 
rent, which do not include adjustments for complicated concessions such as free rent and tenant 
improvement allowances.  Among other things, the results of this study show that there is a 
substantial premium for office properties located within employment centers. 
Dunse and Jones (1998) apply hedonic analysis to identify the significant determinants of 
asking rents in Glasgow, Scotland.  This study includes a good explanation of hedonic analysis 
and a helpful review of previous office studies.  Using methods based on the prior work, Dunse 
and Jones analyze a sample of 477 asking rents, and conclude that building age and location 
factors are the principal determinants of rents. 
Gunnelin and Soderberg (2003) study the term structure of rents using empirical analysis 
applied to a sample of 861 office leases in commercial properties located in Stockholm, Sweden, 
during a boom-and-bust phase from 1977-1991.  The estimated hedonic rent equation was also 
used to construct an office rental index, similar to the approach used by Wheaton and Torto 
(1994).  Gunnelin and Soderberg observe a significant term structure in 7 out if 15 years studied, 
and they conclude that the term structure appears to predict future rents reasonably well. 
Ryan (2005) examines the importance of access to light rail transit and highway systems in 
estimating office and industrial property rents.  This study uses longitudinal data to conduct 
hedonic price analysis of 520 office properties and 500 industrial properties in the San Diego 
metropolitan area from 1986 to 1995.  Ryan finds that access to highways is a significant factor 
in estimating office property rents. 
In summary, the conclusions of the prior literature produce a general set of factors that appear 
to be determinants of office rents.  At the market level, these factors include dummy variables for 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and transaction year, and continuous variables for market 
vacancy.  Many of the prior studies, however, are limited to a single market, so there is no need 
to control for MSA.  Also, some of the prior studies use market vacancy to generate a rental 
index over time, so vacancy is used to generate that index and is not used as part of the hedonic 
estimation. 
At the building level, there are a variety of important factors.  First, physical characteristics 
such as building square feet, number of floors, and age are often used.  Second, the prior studies 
often include qualitative dummy variables that represent building class or specific amenities such 
as parking and retail establishments.  Third, different types of location variables are used.  
Location variables may be distances based on GIS information, submarket dummy variables, or 
demographic information, such as office employment within one mile. 
Finally, at the lease level, most of the prior literature examines the impact of lease square feet.  
Some of the prior work includes lease floor (vertical location) and lease length as predictive 
variables.  In addition, some of the prior studies include dummy variables to indicate the type of 
expense structure (e.g., net, partial net, expense stop, or gross).  However, as noted above, the 
prior studies generally do not include data with regard to contractual provisions, including 
economic terms such as concessions, allowances, and commissions, as well as lease options. 
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Statement of Problem 
This paper uses a comprehensive data set to develop a hedonic model of office rent that 
estimates values of contractual terms such as tenant improvement allowances, leasing 
commissions, and options.  The model includes variables to control for building characteristics 
and market conditions, as well as basic lease terms.  Although other studies have used a similar 
approach, the prior work in this area was limited by the lack of data regarding contractual terms. 
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Chapter 2: Data 
Description of Data 
The primary data set used in this paper includes information about the terms of over 26,000 
lease negotiations.  The data set was generated from a large portfolio of office properties.  The 
data set includes lease negotiations processed between 2001 and 2005.  Over 90% of the lease 
negotiations are classified as office leases, with the remainder being ancillary uses such as retail 
and storage leases. 
Each observation in the data set represents a lease negotiation.  Lease negotiations may be new 
leases, or renewals, expansions/contractions, expirations or terminations of existing leases.  As a 
result, multiple observations may correspond to a single lease, which is defined as a unique 
tenant/building combination. 
For example, one entry may record the negotiation of a new lease, and subsequent entry may 
record the renewal of the same lease, perhaps upon different economic terms.  Often, subsequent 
entries will record increases or decreases in the amount of leased space, as the tenant expands or 
contracts. 
The primary data set includes the following information about each lease negotiation: 
Table 1: Primary Lease Data 
Variable Description 
Lease Number Different number assigned to each unique building/tenant combination. 
Business Unit 
Number 
Different number assigned to each building. 
Business Unit 
Name 
Name of building. 
Market Name of metropolitan statistical area (MSA). 
Tenant Name Name of tenant. 
Unit Number Suite number. 
Activity Type Type of current lease activity (e.g., new lease, renewal, 
expansion/contraction, expiration, termination). 
Start Date Commencement date of initial lease document.  One date per lease. 
End Date Expiration date of most recent lease document.  One date per lease. 
Date Executed Date initial lease document was executed by landlord.  One date per 
lease. 
Date Received Date current lease document was received by landlord. 
Commencement 
Date 
Commencement date of current lease document. 
Term in Months Term in months from commencement date to end date. 
Original Square 
Feet 
Leased space before current lease activity. 
Renewal Square 
Feet 
Leased space after current lease activity. 
Lease Square Feet Square feet subject to current lease activity. 
Current Rent Initial rent per square foot per year. 
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Average Rent  Average rent per square foot per year over term to be paid by tenant.  
Average rent calculation includes the effect of free rent concessions and 
future rent increases/decreases, as well as an estimate of operating 
expenses and taxes. 
Free Rent Free rent per square foot per year over term to be conceded by landlord 
(i.e., months of free rent × rent per square foot per month / lease term in 
years). 
TI Allowance Total tenant improvement allowance per square foot to be paid by 
landlord. 
Affiliated Broker 
Commission 
Total leasing commission per square foot to be paid by landlord. 
Unaffiliated Broker 
Commission 
Total leasing commission per square foot to be paid by landlord. 
Tenant Rep Broker 
Commission 
Total leasing commission per square foot to be paid by landlord. 
Expense Type Type of expense pass-through (e.g., full net, net electric, base year, 
gross). 
Lease Type Type of lease (e.g., office, retail, storage, etc.). 
 
In addition to the primary lease data, a second data set with information about lease options 
was obtained.  The following table describes the lease option types: 
Table 2: Lease Option Types 
Variable Description 
Renewal 
Option 
The right to renew an existing lease.  Terms include exercise timeframe and 
renewal rent.  Renewal rent is sometimes specified but is often defined as fair 
market rent or prevailing market rent. 
Termination 
Option 
The right to terminate an existing lease.  Terms include exercise timeframe 
and cancellation fee.  Cancellation fee may include unamortized portion of 
concessions, allowances, and commissions, in addition to a specified fee, 
often based on a multiple of monthly rent. 
Expansion 
Option 
The right to lease more space.  Terms include identification of space, exercise 
timeframe, and expansion rent.  Terms may also include free rent concessions 
and tenant improvement allowances for new space. 
Contraction 
Option 
The right to lease less space.  Terms include identification of space, exercise 
timeframe, and contraction fee.  Contraction fee similar to termination option 
cancellation fee applied to contraction space on pro rata basis. 
Right of First 
Offer 
The right to lease additional space.  Landlord must offer space to right holder 
before landlord can offer to lease space to a third party.  Terms include 
identification of space, trigger conditions and exercise timeframe. 
Right of First 
Refusal 
The right to lease additional space.  Landlord must offer space to right holder 
before the landlord can accept an offer to lease space from a third party.  
Terms include identification of space, trigger conditions and exercise 
timeframe. 
 
Finally, to supplement the lease data described above, information about building 
characteristics and market conditions was obtained.  The building and market data includes the 
following information: 
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Table 3: Building and Market Data 
Variable Description 
Building Square 
Feet 
Total building square feet. 
Building Number of 
Floors 
Total number of floors above grade in building. 
Year Built Year construction of building was completed.  If a range of years was 
given, then the midpoint year was used. 
CBD/Sub. Central business district or suburban location. 
Building Class Measure of building quality.  All buildings are classified as either A or 
B. 
Market Vacancy By CBD/sub., class, MSA, and year. 
 
The data set is subject to several potential biases.  First, the data was gathered within a limited 
time period.  The generally accepted length of the commercial real estate cycle is ten years, but 
the data covers only five years.  All of these years may have experienced the same market trends, 
and thus the results of this study may not reflect conditions in other parts of the market cycle.  As 
presented below, however, each of the observations is associated with a market vacancy that 
ranges from less than 3% to more than 27%.  The wide range of market vacancy should represent 
a variety of market conditions. 
Second, the working data set includes only new lease negotiations, which may present a 
unique set of issues different than other lease negotiations, such as renewals.  Furthermore, the 
focus on new leases as individual transactions may ignore the effect of concurrent negotiations.  
For example, a national tenant may pay a discounted rent in Boston because it is paying a 
premium rent in Chicago.  Alternatively, a tenant might pay a rent premium in a new lease as a 
condition of the early termination of another lease. 
Third, although the data set is very comprehensive, some potentially important determinants of 
office rents may be omitted.  For example, information about the tenant, including credit rating 
and industry class, may be determinative.  Also, additional location variables such as submarket, 
employment within one mile, and distance from CBD center may have a significant impact on 
rents.  Finally, more qualitative factors about the building or the leased space, such as design 
factors or retail amenities, may be important.  Although some of this information was available, 
the data was incomplete and therefore was not used. 
Review of Data 
This section describes the methods used to analyze the data prior to constructing the hedonic 
model.  Stata statistical software was used to conduct the data analysis and the regression runs.   
There are over 26,000 observations in the complete data set.  The leases are classified into a 
variety of use types, including office, retail, storage, and other uses ancillary to office properties.  
In addition, some observations are classified under special categories such as “shared office” and 
“government office”.  These categories represent office leases under special arrangements or 
with special tenant types. 
The following table presents a tabulation of the entire data set by lease type.  Over 90% of the 
observations are classified as office leases. 
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Table 4: Lease Type Tabulation (All Leases) 
 Lease Type |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
    Amenity |         11        0.04        0.04 
    Antenna |         14        0.05        0.09 
   Drop Box |          1        0.00        0.10 
Shared Ofc. |        554        2.08        2.18 
 Gov’t Ofc. |         12        0.05        2.23 
      Hotel |          1        0.00        2.23 
 Industrial |        140        0.53        2.76 
      Kiosk |          3        0.01        2.77 
     Office |     24,260       91.21       93.98 
    Parking |          1        0.00       93.98 
     Retail |      1,376        5.17       99.16 
   Sublease |          1        0.00       99.16 
    Storage |        160        0.60       99.76 
   Telecom. |         63        0.24      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |     26,597      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
 
Prior to any data analysis, all non-office lease observations (including “shared office” and 
“government office” lease observations) were eliminated from the data set.  There are a total of 
24,260 office lease observations. 
Each office lease observation is classified according to activity type, which indicates the type 
of negotiation (new lease, renewal, termination, etc.).  Based on a review of activity type, 128 
lease observations were dropped, including temporary lease activity, storage arrangements, and 
lease activity denoted as “sold”.  Presumably, sold activity denotes lease activity (new lease, 
renewal, termination, etc.) in a sold building that was nonetheless processed by the landlord after 
the sale. 
A further review of activity type reveals that, in some cases, one lease negotiation is counted 
as two separate activity types.  For example, a renewal of an existing lease and a concurrent 
expansion of the leased space may be recorded once as a renewal and again as an expansion.  
The bifurcated recording system may help the landlord track changes in leased square feet.  For 
purposes of this paper, however, concurrent renewals and expansions/contractions are presented 
as one observation.  1,953 observations were dropped when concurrent negotiations were 
condensed into a single observation. 
As a result of the subtractions described above, the total number of office lease observations 
was reduced to 22,179.  The following table shows a tabulation of office lease observations by 
activity type.  New leases, renewals, and terminations are the most common activity types, 
together encompassing over 75% of the observations. 
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Table 5: Activity Type Tabulation (All Office Leases) 
    Activity | 
        Type |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
-------------+----------------------------------- 
   Amendment |        221        1.00        1.00 
   Expansion |      2,216        9.99       10.99 
   New Lease |      6,368       28.71       39.70 
     Renewal |      4,469       20.15       59.85 
   Reduction |        915        4.13       63.97 
Renewal(Exp) |      1,266        5.71       69.68 
Renewal(Red) |        667        3.01       72.69 
 Termination |      6,057       27.31      100.00 
-------------+----------------------------------- 
       Total |     22,179      100.00 
 
The number of lease terminations during the period may be artificially inflated because 
renewals, expansions and reductions are in some cases considered to be “new” leases that 
“terminate” old leases.  Obviously, these situations are not true lease terminations.  A full 
analysis of “true” versus “false” terminations was not preformed because this paper does not 
study lease termination negotiations. 
The working data set used in this paper includes only new office lease negotiations.  There are 
a total of 6,368 new office lease observations.  Some of these observations were dropped to 
create a more uniform data set.  In addition, some of these observations were eliminated as a 
result of missing data or typographical errors.  Ultimately, the working data set was reduced to a 
total of 4,494 observations.  The following sections describe which observations were dropped 
and why.  The analysis and discussion in the remainder of this paper are limited to the working 
data set. 
Basic Lease Terms 
In general, each new lease observation in the data set includes two dates that are relevant to the 
current negotiation: the date that the lease documentation was received by the landlord and the 
commencement date of the lease.  Usually, the date received precedes the commencement date.  
Sometimes, however, the date received follows the commencement date.  This situation, which 
occurs in less than 15% of the observations, may arise if the lease documentation is not 
completed before the commencement date or, alternatively, the documentation is completed but 
is not forwarded to the lease processing department before the commencement date. 
The lag time from date received to commencement date is between -30 and +360 in over 95% 
of the observations in the working data set.  Lag time is positive when date received precedes 
commencement date, and lag time is negative in the reverse situation.  In this paper, the earlier of 
the year received and the commencement year is used as a proxy for the lease negotiation year.  
(Year received and commencement year are the same 85% of the time.) 
48 observations with lease negotiation years that were missing or outside of the range 2001-
2005 were dropped.  The following table presents a tabulation of the working data set by lease 
negotiation year. 
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Table 6: Lease Negotiation Year Tabulation 
Negotiation | 
       Year |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
       2001 |        278        6.19        6.19 
       2002 |        939       20.89       27.08 
       2003 |      1,101       24.50       51.58 
       2004 |      1,092       24.30       75.88 
       2005 |      1,084       24.12      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      4,494      100.00 
 
Average annual rent values in the working data set have a mean of $25.82 per square foot with 
a standard deviation of $8.30.  The average rent calculation includes the effect of free rent 
concessions and specified future rent increases/decreases, as well as an estimate of operating 
expenses and taxes.  The data set includes a small number of leases with future rent changes 
indexed to the CPI.  24 CPI leases were identified and deleted. 
In addition, 87 observations with missing average rent or zero average rent were dropped, 
because this result does not appear to make economic sense.  These values may have been 
typographical errors, or these leases may have been negotiated together with other leases, as part 
of a larger, multi-lease transaction. 
Table 7: Annualized Average Rent (Dollars per Square Foot) 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%        12.24           2.47 
 5%        16.37           3.09 
10%           18           5.31       Obs                4494 
25%        20.98           5.54       Sum of Wgt.        4494 
 
50%        24.03                      Mean           25.81632 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      8.298522 
75%         28.8          87.84 
90%           36          90.24       Variance       68.86547 
95%        40.13          96.35       Skewness        2.10344 
99%        57.12          104.1       Kurtosis         12.099 
 
Lease terms in the working data set have a mean of approximately 53 months and a standard 
deviation of 27 months.  The median value is 60 months (5 years).  514 observations with lease 
terms of less than 12 months were dropped.  These short term leases are believed to have 
different characteristics than a typical office lease.  Often, they are month to month leases.  
Sometimes, a short term lease is a temporary solution that gives the parties time to negotiate a 
more permanent lease arrangement. 
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Table 8: Lease Term in Months 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%           12             12 
 5%           12             12 
10%           24             12       Obs                4494 
25%           36             12       Sum of Wgt.        4494 
 
50%           60                      Mean           52.72486 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.       27.3438 
75%           62            191 
90%           84            192       Variance       747.6835 
95%          120            192       Skewness        1.02503 
99%          126            192       Kurtosis       4.646337 
 
The size of leased space in the working data set has a mean of approximately 5,900 square feet 
with a standard deviation of 10,200 square feet.  Notably, the median value of 3,000 square feet 
is significantly lower then the mean.  28 observations with leased space of less than 250 square 
feet were dropped.  Again, these small space leases are thought to have different attributes than a 
typical office lease, due to the type of space and/or the type of tenant who might rent such space.   
Table 9: Lease Square Feet 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%          449            267 
 5%          840            280 
10%         1091            288       Obs                4494 
25%         1797            291       Sum of Wgt.        4494 
 
50%       3023.5                      Mean           5934.824 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      10262.73 
75%         5884         148866 
90%        12921         166487       Variance       1.05e+08 
95%        20653         170564       Skewness       7.638873 
99%        47158         201800       Kurtosis       96.21814 
 
The lease observations in the working data set are categorized into three basic expense types: 
net, base year, and gross.  Approximately 20% of the leases are net, meaning that the tenant pays 
all expenses.  Two thirds of the leases are base year (or expense stop) leases, which require the 
landlord to pay a base amount of expenses, and the tenant pays any expenses in excess of the 
base amount.  The remaining leases are assumed to be gross, meaning that the landlord pays all 
expenses.  As noted above, the average rent term includes an estimate of operating expenses and 
taxes per square foot. 
Table 10: Expense Type Tabulation 
    Expense Type |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
-----------------+----------------------------------- 
       BASE YEAR |      3,042       67.69       67.69 
           GROSS |        437        9.72       77.41 
             NET |      1,015       22.59      100.00 
-----------------+----------------------------------- 
           Total |      4,494      100.00 
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Although 53 base year leases are denoted as “net electric”, in general it is not apparent from 
the data set whether covered expenses include taxes and insurance in addition to common 
operating expenses such as water, electricity, repairs and maintenance. 
Concessions, Allowances and Commissions 
Free rent is a commonly negotiated lease concession that allows the tenant to reduce the 
amount of rent to be paid but at the same time permits the landlord to report a higher amount of 
nominal rent.  In the working data set, about 44% of the lease negotiations include free rent 
concessions.  Free rent is often expressed in terms of months, but the data set presents free rent in 
terms of dollars per square foot per year (the same units as average rent). 
Table 11: Annualized Free Rent (Dollars per Square Foot) 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%           .1            .02 
 5%          .26            .02 
10%          .37            .03       Obs                1973 
25%           .6            .03       Sum of Wgt.        1973 
 
50%          .95                      Mean           1.134234 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .8626427 
75%         1.42           7.52 
90%         2.05           8.57       Variance       .7441525 
95%         2.64           9.24       Skewness       3.035685 
99%         4.44          10.38       Kurtosis       21.22352 
 
To provide additional understanding of the free rent term, the following table presents free rent 
in months, which is equal to annualized free rent per square foot multiplied by lease term in 
years divided by average rent per month.  Measured this way, free rent has a mean of 2.9 months 
and a standard deviation of 2.6 months. 
Table 12: Free Rent in Months 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%     .1572052       .0441315 
 5%      .540242       .0533333 
10%     .9484193       .0648649       Obs                1973 
25%     1.009641       .0712589       Sum of Wgt.        1973 
 
50%     2.056402                      Mean            2.91115 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      2.646917 
75%     3.661017       21.22242 
90%     5.996666       23.54825       Variance       7.006167 
95%      7.65007        29.9811       Skewness       3.305674 
99%     12.56119       32.94331       Kurtosis       23.82842 
 
Tenant improvement allowances (TIs) are another common landlord concession in office 
leases.  In theory, tenant improvement allowances are a method to finance the build-out of the 
leased space.  In the working data set, about 82% of the lease negotiations include tenant 
improvement allowances.  As shown in the following table, tenant improvement allowances in 
the data set have a mean of $17.07 per square foot with a standard deviation of $13.91. 
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Table 13: Tenant Improvement Allowance per Square Foot 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%           .5            .05 
 5%         1.34            .05 
10%          2.5            .05       Obs                3635 
25%            6            .07       Sum of Wgt.        3635 
 
50%        14.23                      Mean           17.07125 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      13.91685 
75%           25          93.58 
90%        35.57          99.62       Variance       193.6787 
95%        43.69          100.1       Skewness       1.315931 
99%           60         103.97       Kurtosis       5.535552 
 
One might speculate that the amount of TIs will increase with longer lease terms, which are 
presumably higher value transactions that give both the landlord and the tenant greater incentives 
to invest in the leased space.  Fisher (2004) provides an interesting study of the relationship 
between lease length and landlord investment.  Furthermore, because TIs are generally amortized 
over the term of the lease, it is interesting to compare TIs on the basis of dollars per square foot 
per year.  The following table shows that, on an annualized basis, TIs have a mean of $3.61 per 
square foot with a standard deviation of $2.69. 
Table 14: Annualized Tenant Improvement Allowance 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%     .1621622            .01 
 5%           .5       .0315789 
10%     .8571429       .0348387       Obs                3635 
25%     1.666667       .0483871       Sum of Wgt.        3635 
 
50%        3.035                      Mean           3.610066 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      2.685996 
75%        4.904           19.7 
90%        6.832       23.02703       Variance       7.214576 
95%          8.4          23.06       Skewness        1.82271 
99%       13.348             28       Kurtosis       9.600488 
 
About 88% of the observations include some amount of leasing commissions.  Leasing 
commissions are tabulated separately for affiliated brokers, unaffiliated brokers, and tenant rep 
brokers.  These three amounts are added to produce a total amount of leasing commissions per 
square foot of leased space.  Four observations were dropped because they included commissions 
that appeared to be excessive and possibly were the result of data entry errors.  Leasing 
commissions per square foot are presented below. 
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Table 15: Leasing Commissions per Square Foot 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%           .7            .06 
 5%         1.36          .0981 
10%            2             .2       Obs                3970 
25%         3.58            .23       Sum of Wgt.        3970 
 
50%         5.74                      Mean           6.150937 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      3.643546 
75%         7.86          26.77 
90%       10.425          27.82       Variance       13.27542 
95%         12.5          32.97       Skewness       1.478903 
99%        18.84          37.25       Kurtosis       7.937641 
 
As with TIs, it is instructive to examine leasing commissions on an annualized basis.  Like TIs, 
leasing commissions are generally amortized over the lease term.  In addition, annualized leasing 
commissions are easy to compare with average rent per year and annualized TIs.  The following 
table shows that, on an annualized basis, leasing commissions have a mean of $1.40 per square 
foot with a standard deviation of $0.56. 
Table 16: Annualized Leasing Commissions 
                           adj_lc 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%         .345       .0560571 
 5%          .57            .06 
10%           .8       .0766667       Obs                3970 
25%         1.02       .0766667       Sum of Wgt.        3970 
 
50%         1.35                      Mean           1.404754 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .5647274 
75%     1.666667           4.75 
90%     2.064787           4.83       Variance       .3189171 
95%         2.39         4.8864       Skewness       1.297293 
99%          3.3              6       Kurtosis       7.639564 
 
Given the data described above, the total consideration over the term of each lease can be 
calculated as the average rent per year (which includes the effect of free rent and an estimate of 
expenses) multiplied by lease term in years less the total amount of any tenant improvement 
allowances and leasing commissions.  In ten cases, the total consideration was a negative 
amount.  As with zero average rent leases, there may be an explanation for this result, but this 
paper does not attempt to analyze these observations, which were dropped. 
Lease Options 
Lease options are generally desirable to tenants in order to provide flexibility.  For example, 
renewal options are commonly negotiated, as well as termination options or options to expand or 
contract the leased space.  Landlords may also desire flexibility and may negotiate options to 
relocate tenants or terminate leases under certain conditions. 
The terms of these options are specific to each negotiation and may differ substantially, even 
within each category.  For example, a termination option may or may not require a cancellation 
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fee, and may be exercisable at any time or only at certain times.  Furthermore, the option may be 
held by the tenant, the landlord, or both parties. 
The following table shows the number of leases in the working data set that include each 
option type. 
Table 17: Lease Option Tabulation 
Option Type   |      Freq.     Percent 
--------------+----------------------- 
Renewal       |      1,967       43.77 
--------------+----------------------- 
Termination   |        649       14.44 
--------------+----------------------- 
Expansion     |        114        2.54 
--------------+----------------------- 
Reduction     |         50        1.11 
 
Rights of first offer (RFOs) and rights of first refusal (RFRs) are also common in office leases.  
Both offer rights and refusal rights give the tenant the right to lease additional space from the 
landlord in the future, but a right of first offer is triggered before a third-party negotiation and a 
right of first refusal is triggered after a third-party negotiation, as discussed below. 
A right of first offer requires the landlord to offer the subject space to the holder of the RFO 
before offering to lease the space to a third party (pre-negotiation).  The terms of the offer may 
or may not be specified in the RFO.  If the holder of the RFO does not accept the offer, then the 
landlord may lease the space to another tenant.  But the landlord may not lease the space on 
terms more favorable to the tenant unless the more favorable terms are first offered to the holder 
of the RFO. 
A right of first refusal is more restrictive from the landlord’s point of view.  A right of first 
refusal requires the landlord to offer the subject space to the holder of the RFR before accepting 
an offer to lease the space from a third party (post- negotiation).  The holder of the RFR has the 
right to accept the terms of the lease that the parties have negotiated.  As a result, the space will 
be difficult to lease, because any potential tenant will hesitate to spend time and money 
negotiating the terms of a lease that might be accepted by the holder of the RFR. 
The following table shows the number of leases that include rights of first offer/refusal. 
Table 18: Right of First Offer/Refusal Tabulation 
Type          |      Freq.     Percent 
--------------+----------------------- 
Right of      | 
First Offer   |        575       12.79 
--------------+----------------------- 
Right of      | 
First Refusal |        144        3.20 
--------------+----------------------- 
Offer/Refusal | 
Rights        |        701       15.60 
 
The table also shows that 701 leases include either or both rights.  (Note that 18 observations 
include both offer rights and refusal rights.)  Because these rights are very similar, and may in 
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fact be prone to misinterpretation as one or the other, this paper treats RFOs and RFRs as the 
same type of amenity. 
All option amenities can be summed within each observation to show how many option types 
are included in each lease.  Leases may include different option types as well as multiple options 
of the same type.  For example, one lease may include a renewal option as well as two or more 
expansion options that apply to different building suites and are subject to different terms and 
conditions. 
The table below presents the number of option types by lease, but does not count multiple 
options of the same type. 
Table 19: Number of Options per Lease 
   # of | Renew. |  Term. |   Exp. |   Red. |  RFOs/ |   # of 
Options |  Opts. |  Opts. |  Opts. |  Opts. |   RFRs | Leases | Percent 
--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+-------- 
      0 |      0 |      0 |      0 |      0 |      0 |  2,217 |   49.33 
      1 |  1,115 |    189 |      9 |      3 |     73 |  1,389 |   30.91 
      2 |    590 |    254 |     22 |     10 |    368 |    622 |   13.84 
      3 |    220 |    170 |     49 |     12 |    218 |    223 |    4.96 
      4 |     35 |     29 |     27 |     18 |     35 |     36 |    0.80 
      5 |      7 |      7 |      7 |      7 |      7 |      7 |    0.16 
--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+-------- 
  Total |  1,967 |    649 |    114 |     50 |    701 |  4,494 |  100.00 
 
As the table shows, about half of the observations do not include any options.  Renewal 
options are the most common variety, and termination options and offer/refusal rights are 
generally negotiated as the second or third option in a lease. 
Building Characteristics 
Building data was obtained and was merged with lease data.  The working data set includes 
384 different buildings.  The following table shows a summary of the number of leases per 
building.  Note that some buildings have very few lease observations during the study period 
(recall that the working data set includes only new leases and excludes lease renewals). 
Table 20: Leases per Building 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%            1              1 
 5%            1              1 
10%            1              1       Obs                 384 
25%            4              1       Sum of Wgt.         384 
 
50%          8.5                      Mean            11.5599 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      11.06716 
75%           16             52 
90%           26             52       Variance        122.482 
95%           32             71       Skewness       2.351868 
99%           52             93       Kurtosis        12.8652 
 
Each of the building characteristics is discussed below.  Unless otherwise indicated, the 
statistics are across buildings (384 observations) not leases (4,494 observations).  Some of the 
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building statistics are used to generate lease statistics.  For example, year built is subtracted from 
negotiation year to generate age, which is a lease-specific variable. 
Building square feet has a mean of approximately 230,000 square feet with a standard 
deviation of 240,000.  Several buildings include over 1 million square feet.  Over 80% of the 
buildings are less than 500,000 square feet. 
Table 21: Building Square Feet Summary 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%        21275           4300 
 5%        41808          13588 
10%        50377          14108       Obs                 384 
25%        87294          21275       Sum of Wgt.         384 
 
50%     150146.5                      Mean           229717.4 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      241929.7 
75%       275021        1329810 
90%       502365        1458808       Variance       5.85e+10 
95%       706864        1520288       Skewness       2.798729 
99%      1329810        1765694       Kurtosis       13.06223 
 
Lease square feet (discussed above) was divided by building square feet to produce lease 
proportion, a lease-specific measure of relative lease size.  Lease proportion is expressed in 
percentage terms.  Note that most individual leases in the working data set constitute a very 
small percentage of building size.  See Table 9 for a summary of lease size in square feet. 
Table 22: Lease Proportion (Lease-Specific) 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%     .0804044       .0281002 
 5%      .216861       .0286679 
10%     .3512008       .0291409       Obs                4494 
25%     .7089615       .0330201       Sum of Wgt.        4494 
 
50%     1.477878                      Mean           3.214214 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      6.025146 
75%     3.252409        89.1807 
90%     6.965815       96.59756       Variance       36.30238 
95%     11.42893            100       Skewness       7.035457 
99%      30.0671            100       Kurtosis         79.847 
 
Information about number of floors in each building was also included in the data set.  Number 
of floors ranges from 1 to 76, with mean of 10 and a median of 6 floors. 
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Table 23: Building Number of Floors 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%            1              1 
 5%            2              1 
10%            2              1       Obs                 384 
25%            3              1       Sum of Wgt.         384 
 
50%            6                      Mean           10.19531 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      10.60055 
75%           13             48 
90%           24             52       Variance       112.3717 
95%           34             54       Skewness       2.226358 
99%           48             76       Kurtosis       9.154459 
 
As presented in the following table, year built of each building ranges from 1893 to 2004.  
65% of the buildings were built from 1980 to 1989.   
Table 24: Year Built 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%         1906           1893 
 5%         1967           1898 
10%         1972           1899       Obs                 384 
25%         1980           1906       Sum of Wgt.         384 
 
50%         1984                      Mean           1982.586 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      12.64964 
75%         1988           2001 
90%         1996           2003       Variance       160.0135 
95%         1999           2004       Skewness       -3.43672 
99%         2001           2004       Kurtosis       22.77217 
 
Year built was subtracted from lease negotiation year to generate age, which is a lease-specific 
variable.  In this study, ages do not vary much within the same building, but over a longer study 
period, the same building may be leased at many different ages.  The following table is a 
summary of age.  Note that a value of -1 indicates that the building was pre-leased (lease 
negotiation year precedes year built). 
Table 25: Age (Lease-Specific) 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%            2             -1 
 5%            9             -1 
10%           13             -1       Obs                4494 
25%           16             -1       Sum of Wgt.        4494 
 
50%           19                      Mean           21.20316 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      12.10663 
75%           23            110 
90%           31            111       Variance       146.5706 
95%           35            111       Skewness        3.21068 
99%           75            112       Kurtosis       17.97127 
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The following table shows a tabulation of the lease and building observations in the working 
data set by CBD/suburban classification.  Note that the leasing activity is roughly the same 
proportion of CBD to suburban as the building observations. 
Table 26: CBD/Suburban Tabulation 
            |     Lease        Lease |      Bldg.       Bldg. 
   CBD/Sub. |      Freq.     Percent |      Freq.     Percent 
------------+------------------------+----------------------- 
        CBD |      1,078       23.99 |         79       20.57 
   Suburban |      3,416       76.01 |        305       79.43 
------------+------------------------+----------------------- 
      Total |      4,494      100.00 |        384      100.00 
 
The following table shows a tabulation of the lease and building observations in the working 
data set by building class.  As with the CBD/suburban classification, the leasing activity is in the 
same relative proportion as the building observations. 
Table 27: Building Class Tabulation 
   Building |     Lease        Lease |      Bldg.       Bldg. 
      Class |      Freq.     Percent |      Freq.     Percent 
------------+------------------------+----------------------- 
          A |      3,588       79.84 |        303       78.91 
          B |        906       20.16 |         81       21.09 
------------+------------------------+----------------------- 
      Total |      4,494      100.00 |        384      100.00 
 
When building data was added, 423 lease observations in 83 buildings were dropped because 
building square feet, number of floors, or location (CBD/suburban) was unavailable.  In addition, 
675 lease observations in 76 buildings were dropped because there was no information regarding 
year built.  For the most part, these dropped observations appear to be buildings that were sold 
by the landlord, which may introduce a bias to the data. 
Market Conditions 
Market conditions include time, quality, and location factors.  Time and quality are measured 
by the negotiation year variable and the building class variable.  The location variables in the 
data set include the CBD/suburban classification, and a discreet variable for market (MSA), 
discussed below. 
There are 16 MSAs included in the working data set.  Due to an insufficient number of leases 
or buildings per MSA (less than 50 leases or 5 buildings), 61 observations and 3 MSAs were 
dropped.  Additional MSAs were previously eliminated due to missing data or other reasons 
described above. 
The following table shows a tabulation of the lease and building observations in the working 
data set by MSA. 
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Table 28: MSA Tabulation 
            |     Lease        Lease |      Bldg.       Bldg. 
        MSA |      Freq.     Percent |      Freq.     Percent 
------------+------------------------+----------------------- 
        ATL |        187        4.16 |         24        6.25 
        BOS |        305        6.79 |         42       10.94 
        CHG |        495       11.01 |         24        6.25 
         DC |        150        3.34 |         19        4.95 
        DEN |        199        4.43 |         13        3.39 
        EBY |        189        4.21 |         11        2.86 
         LA |        317        7.05 |         32        8.33 
        NYC |         53        1.18 |          6        1.56 
         OC |        424        9.43 |         29        7.55 
        POR |        360        8.01 |         29        7.55 
        SAC |        233        5.18 |         25        6.51 
         SD |         99        2.20 |         10        2.60 
        SEA |        434        9.66 |         30        7.81 
         SF |        519       11.55 |         45       11.72 
         SJ |        454       10.10 |         38        9.90 
        STM |         76        1.69 |          7        1.82 
------------+------------------------+----------------------- 
      Total |      4,494      100.00 |        384      100.00 
 
All of the market variables (CBD/suburban, building class, MSA, and negotiation year) are 
combined to determine the market vacancy rate, which is based on historical market data.  The 
following table presents a brief summary of the current and lagged vacancy rates (1 year lag) that 
correspond with the observations in the working data set. 
Table 29: Market Vacancy 
      Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
---------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       Vacancy |      4494    16.41734    4.952767        2.6      27.23 
---------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagged vacancy |      4494    16.68632     5.29568       1.08      27.23 
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Summary of Data 
The working data set consists of 4,494 observations.  The following table shows the order in 
which observations were dropped to get to the working data set. 
Table 30: Order of Elimination of Observations 
Data Set/Lease Observations Eliminated # of Observations 
Complete Data Set       26,597  
Non-Office Leases       (2,337) 
Temporary, Storage or Sold Activity Type          (128) 
Concurrent Negotiations       (1,953) 
Office Leases       22,179  
Non-New Leases      (15,811) 
New Office Leases        6,368  
Lease Negotiation Year Pre-2001 or Missing            (48) 
CPI Leases            (24) 
Average Rent Zero or Missing            (87) 
Lease Term Less Than 12 Months          (514) 
Lease Square Feet Less Than 250            (28) 
Excessive Leasing Commissions              (4) 
Total Consideration Less Than Zero            (10) 
No Building SF, # of Floors, or Location Info          (423) 
No Year Built Info          (675) 
Less Than 50 Leases or 5 Buildings in MSA            (61) 
Working Data Set        4,494  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
The methodology used to generate the hedonic model is simple linear regression.  As 
discussed below, some of the continuous variables are categorized into dummy variables, and 
some variables are combined to produce interaction terms. 
Dependent Variable 
The natural log of average rent per square foot per year is used as the dependent variable in 
this paper.  The average rent calculation includes the effect of free rent concessions and future 
rent increases/decreases, as well as an estimate of operating expenses and taxes.  Landlord 
payments such as tenant improvement allowances and leasing commissions are not subtracted 
from average rent.  Instead, these amounts are used as independent variables on the right-hand 
side of the regression equation. 
Average rent is not discounted and is stated in nominal dollars.  In theory, “net effective rent” 
is a better measure of value than average rent.  Although the data set includes a net present value 
of each lease negotiation, this figure was considered to be unreliable due to the potential 
variations in assumptions and methods used to calculate each NPV.  Therefore, average rent was 
used as the next best alternative.  Wheaton and Torto (1994) also use an alternative to net 
effective rent as the dependent variable. 
Dummy Variables 
Dummy variables were generated for the categorical variables of expense type, CBD/suburban, 
building class, MSA, and year.  The omitted values were net lease, suburban, class B, Chicago, 
and 2005. 
Additional dummy variables were generated for some of the continuous variables.  TIs and 
leasing commissions presented a unique problem, because these variables were equal to zero in 
approximately one fourth of the observations.  The non-zero values of these variables ranged up 
to over $100 per square foot for TIs, and over $35 per square foot for leasing commissions.  The 
annualized values of these variables provided a tighter range of values, which were categorized 
into three dummy variables with the divisions loosely based on the 20th and 80th percentiles.  The 
base case (omitted dummy) is a lease with no TIs or leasing commissions. 
The following tables show the distribution of observations among the dummy variables for 
annualized TIs and leasing commissions (LCs) per square foot. 
Table 31: TI Dummy Variables 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       TI=$0 |       859           0           0          0          0 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   $0<TI<=$1 |       538    .6335188    .3005297        .01          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   $1<TI<=$5 |      2272     2.93755    1.108843   1.010323          5 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       $5<TI |       825    7.403206    2.633062      5.002         28 
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Table 32: LC Dummy Variables 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      LC=$0  |       524           0           0          0          0 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   $0<LC<=$1 |       932    .7813075    .2223954   .0560571          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   $1<LC<=$2 |      2584    1.437286    .2587117   1.000449          2 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       $2<LC |       454    2.499449    .5515511    2.00069          6 
 
Dummy variables were also created for building age categories.  The categories are based on 
age groups that are assumed to share similar attributes: less than or equal to 2, 3-15, 16-30, and 
more than 30 years old.  The base case (omitted dummy) is a lease in a building over 30 years 
old.  Recall that age is a lease-specific variable and that a value of -1 indicates pre-leasing 
activity. 
Table 33: Age Dummy Variables 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      Age<=2 |        56        .375    1.121079         -1          2 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   2<Age<=15 |      1020    12.17549    3.427303          3         15 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
  15<Age<=30 |      2941    20.59708     3.65053         16         30 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      Age>30 |       477    46.68973    19.92518         31        112 
 
Finally, dummy variables were generated based on options data.  A dummy variable 
representing each option type was assigned a value of 1 whenever that option type was included 
in the lease.  Rights of first offer/refusal were combined into one option category.  The base case 
(omitted dummy) is a lease with no options or lease rights.  See Table 17 and Table 18 for 
tabulations of options and lease rights. 
Interaction Terms 
In addition to the dummy variables, some interaction terms were generated between variables.  
Namely, the negotiation year dummy variables were interacted with lease term in months as well 
as the options dummy variables. 
The lease term interactions are equal to the negotiation year dummy variables multiplied by 
the lease term in months.  Each observation includes five lease term interaction values (five 
possible negotiation years), four of which are equal to zero.  The fifth interaction term is equal to 
the lease term in months.  These interactions will allow the term structure of rents to vary over 
time. 
The options interaction terms are equal to the negotiation year dummy variables multiplied by 
the options dummy variables.  Each observation includes 25 option interaction values (five 
option types in each of the five possible negotiation years).  Twenty of the interaction terms are 
equal to zero (five option types in each of the four years which are not equal to the negotiation 
year).  The other five interactions are either zero or one, depending on whether the option types 
are included in the lease.  It is possible that all of the option interactions are zero, if the lease 
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does not include any options.  Like the lease term interactions, the option interaction will allow 
the effect of lease options to vary over time. 
Linear Regression 
The following table shows all of the regression variables (excluding the interaction terms), 
grouped into lease, building, and market-specific categories. 
Table 34: Regression Variables 
Lease-Specific Building-Specific Market-Specific 
Average Rent Over Term Building Square Feet MSA (dummy var.) 
Lease Term in Months Building Number of Floors Year (dummy var.) 
Lease Square Feet CBD/suburban (dummy var.) Vacancy (by CBD/ sub., 
class, MSA, and year) 
Lease Proportion Building Class (dummy var.)  
Building Age (dummy var.)   
Expense Type (dummy var.)   
TI Allowance Over Term 
(dummy var.) 
  
Leasing Commissions Over 
Term (dummy var.) 
  
Option Data (dummy var.)   
 
The appendix to this paper includes a covariance matrix with all of the regression variables. 
The regression equation used in this paper is a log-linear form, based on prior studies and the 
conclusions of Brennan et al. (1984).  In this form, the dependent variable is the natural log of 
average rent per square foot per year.  As a result, each variable will have a constant percentage 
impact on average rent.  This impact is approximately equal to the regression coefficient 
multiplied by the change in units of the regression variable.  For example, a coefficient of .002 
for lease square feet means that an increase of 10,000 square feet will increase rent by 
approximately .002 * 10,000 = 20%.  Because dummy variables can only assume values of 0 or 
1, the coefficients themselves represent the percentage impact of these variables. 
Through the process of experimentation with the variables and different regression equations, 
certain variables were added or dropped.  Term in months squared was added.  This variable is 
designed to show whether the effect of a unit change in lease term in months is increasing or 
decreasing with each additional month (concave or convex). 
Both building square feet and building number of floors were dropped.  The combination of 
lease square feet, lease proportion, and the CBD dummy variable was determined to be a better 
combination of variables without building square feet and building number of floors. 
In addition, the options data with respect to space expansion and reduction options (and the 
related interaction terms) were dropped because there were not enough observations in the 
working data set. 
Finally, lagged vacancy (1 year lag) was used instead of current vacancy.  Many studies have 
concluded that lagged vacancy is a better indicator of current rent, including Wheaton and Torto 
(1994). 
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Here is the form of the regression equation (excluding the interaction terms): 
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where: 
 R Average rent per square foot per year. 
 TERM Lease term in months. 
 SQFT Lease square feet. 
 PROP Lease proportion. 
 CBD (=1 if CBD, =0 if suburban) 
 CLASS (=1 if class A, =0 if class B) 
 VAC Lagged vacancy (1 year lag). 
 AGE Dummy variable for each age group (<=2, 3-15, 16-30). 
 MSA Dummy variable for each MSA (except CHG). 
 YEAR Dummy variable for each year (except 2005). 
 EXP Dummy variable for each expense type (except NET). 
 TI Dummy variable for each TI/sf/yr group (<$1, $1-5, >$5) 
 LC Dummy variable for each LC/sf/yr group (<$1, $1-2, >$2) 
 RENEW (=1 if option to renew, =0 otherwise) 
 TRMNT (=1 if option to terminate, = 0 otherwise) 
 ROF (=1 if right of first offer/refusal, =0 otherwise) 
 α, β, δ, λ, ,μ ρ, τ Estimated statistical parameters. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
This section presents the results of three regression runs: the base case and two models 
including the interaction terms described above. 
Model #1 
The base case regression excludes the interaction terms.  Table 35 presents the base case 
results.  Dummy variables are indicated by “D_”. 
The adjusted R-squared value of the base case model is 55%.  Various experimental iterations, 
which added, subtracted, and combined different variables, consistently produced models with 
R-squared values between 50-60%.  This range is consistent with the prior literature.  See Dunse 
and Jones (1998). 
The positive coefficient for lease term in months indicates that there is a rent premium for 
longer leases.  The negative coefficient for term squared, on the other hand, shows that the 
additional premium per month decreases with each additional month.  The result is that, on 
average across all markets, there is an upward-sloping, convex term structure of rent.  Based on 
the model, an additional 12 months of lease term will increase rent by approximately 2.4%.  
Model #2, discussed below, will use the lease term interactions to analyze term structure within 
different lease negotiation years. 
The positive coefficient for lease square feet shows that there is a rent premium for larger 
leases.  However, the effect is not statistically significant and the very small magnitude of the 
coefficient indicates that the “size premium” is very small.  Lease proportion, which measures 
size as a percentage of building square feet, has a greater impact on rent levels.  The coefficient 
for lease proportion is negative, meaning that there is a rent discount for leases that occupy a 
larger proportion of the building space.  Lease proportion is expressed in percentage terms.  
Therefore, an additional 10% of lease proportion (i.e., an additional 10,000 square feet in a 
100,000 square foot building) will decrease rent by 4.7%. 
The coefficient for the CBD dummy variable indicates that there is a 3.8% premium applicable 
to CBD office leases, as opposed to suburban. 
The class A dummy variable has a large impact on rent levels.  Based on the model, class A 
office leases will command a 16.7% premium over class B. 
Only one building age group is statistically significant.  The model indicates that there is an 
11.8% premium for a new building (less than or equal to 2 years old), as opposed to a building 
more than 30 years old (the omitted age group).  The model does not show a significant 
difference among the other building age groups. 
All but two of the MSA dummy variables have a significant impact on rent.  Furthermore, the 
coefficients generally have the expected signs and magnitudes.  At the low and high ends of the 
spectrum, New York rents include a 50% premium over Chicago (the omitted MSA), and Denver 
rents include a 31.9% discount. 
All of the lease negotiation years are statistically significant.  The model shows that 2001 was 
the best year within the study period.  The model also shows that 2005 (the omitted year) was an 
improvement over the prior years.  Both of these results are consistent with the general state of 
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the overall office market, which weakened in the early 2000’s, after the tech bust and 9/11, and 
strengthened in 2005. 
The model uses lagged vacancy, in addition to MSA and year dummies, to approximate market 
conditions.  Lagged vacancy has the advantage of being a continuous variable.  Based on the 
regression results, a 5% decrease in vacancy rate will increase rent by 6.5%.  Recall that vacancy 
is by CBD/suburban and building class as well as by MSA and year.  The coefficients of these 
dummy variables represent any variation among categories that is not reflected in the vacancy 
statistic. 
The coefficients for the expense type dummy variables may be misleading.  Other studies have 
concluded that net rents, where the tenant pays all expenses, will be lower than gross or base 
year (expense stop) rents, where the landlord pays all or a portion of the expenses.  See Wheaton 
and Torto (1994); Glasscock et al. (1990).  In this study, the dependent variable includes an 
estimate of operating expenses and taxes.  Therefore, as adjusted, net rents should be the same as 
gross rents and base year rents.  The regression model, however, predicts that base year leases 
will generate a 4.1% discount below net leases (the omitted expense type), and gross leases will 
result in a 7.6% discount. 
With the possible exception of the expense type dummy variables, the basic lease, building and 
market parameters discussed above appear to work well in the base case model.  The next 
variables to consider are the contractual terms, including allowances, commissions, and lease 
options. 
Tenant improvement allowances and leasing commissions appear to follow a similar pattern.  
Low levels of TIs and LCs do not appear to have a significant impact on rent.  At higher levels, 
however, the presence of TIs and LCs has a significant positive impact on rent.  Recall that both 
TIs and LCs are expressed on an annualized basis in dollars per square foot per year.  The model 
predicts that leases with TIs above $5/sf/yr will produce a rent premium of 4.9%, in comparison 
to a lease with no tenant improvement allowance.  The predicted effect of leasing commissions is 
even greater.  Above a threshold of $2/sf/yr, the presence of LCs will increase rent by 15.9% 
over a lease with no leasing commissions. 
A review of the option dummy variables reveals that renewal options do not appear to 
consistently affect rent levels, but that both termination options and rights of offer/refusal appear 
to generate rent discounts.  Termination options are associated with a 3.7% discount from leases 
with no options, and rights of first offer/refusal generate a 2.6% discount.  Models #2 and 3 
analyze the impact of lease options within different lease negotiation years. 
Model #2 
Model #2 includes the interactions between negotiation year, lease term and options.  Lease 
term in months, term squared, and the dummy variables for negotiation year and lease options 
are excluded.  With the exclusion of the year dummy variable, lagged vacancy and the 
interaction terms will represent market conditions in each year. 
Table 36 presents the results of model #2.  Interaction terms are indicated by “I_”.  The 
adjusted R-squared value is essentially unchanged from the base case.  And the coefficients for 
the non-interaction variables are also consistent with the base case. 
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The lease term interactions show that there is a consistent upward-sloping term structure in 
every year.  This demonstrates the robustness of model #1, which produces the average term 
structure across all years.  Based on the results of model #2, model #1 appears to be an accurate 
representation of the term structure.  Therefore, the lease term interactions are unnecessary and 
are eliminated in model #3. 
The option interaction variables are not consistent across all years.  In most years, the impact 
of all three options is insignificant, but in 2002 rights of first offer/refusal have a negative effect 
on rent levels, and in 2005 renewal options have a positive effect while termination options have 
a negative effect.  Model #3 further examines these results. 
Model #3 
Model #3 includes the option interaction terms but not the lease term interactions.  As with the 
base case, lease term in months and term squared are included.  As with model #2, the dummy 
variables for lease negotiation year and lease options are excluded. 
Table 37 presents the results of model #3.  Again, the adjusted R-squared value is unchanged 
from the base case.  Note that the lagged vacancy has a greater impact in this model.  This 
change may be due to the omission of interaction terms with respect to leases that do not include 
any options, which forces lagged vacancy to completely represent market conditions in each 
year. 
The option interaction terms in this model are similar to the previous regression.  Interestingly, 
renewal options are associated with rent discounts in 2003 and rent premiums in 2005.  
Termination options appear to have consistently negative impacts, with significant values in 
2004 and 2005.  Rights of first offer/refusal also tend to have negative impacts, especially in 
2002 and 2004. 
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Table 35: Model #1 (Base Case) 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    4494 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 40,  4453) =  137.40 
       Model |  210.215226    40  5.25538065           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  170.325241  4453  .038249549           R-squared     =  0.5524 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5484 
       Total |  380.540467  4493  .084696298           Root MSE      =  .19557 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    log_rent |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 term_in_mos |   .0020705   .0003845     5.38   0.000     .0013166    .0028244 
   term_sqrd |  -4.45e-06   2.75e-06    -1.62   0.105    -9.84e-06    9.38e-07 
  lease_sqft |   7.07e-07   4.30e-07     1.64   0.101    -1.37e-07    1.55e-06 
  lease_prop |  -.0047011   .0006611    -7.11   0.000    -.0059973    -.003405 
       D_cbd |   .0380627   .0108036     3.52   0.000     .0168822    .0592431 
   D_class_A |   .1670899   .0083736    19.95   0.000     .1506736    .1835062 
    D_age<=2 |   .1176023   .0294103     4.00   0.000     .0599435     .175261 
  D_age_3-15 |   .0075326   .0124821     0.60   0.546    -.0169386    .0320038 
 D_age_16-30 |   .0090369   .0108725     0.83   0.406    -.0122787    .0303524 
   D_msa_ATL |  -.2340063    .018412   -12.71   0.000     -.270103   -.1979097 
   D_msa_BOS |    .136265   .0159895     8.52   0.000     .1049176    .1676124 
    D_msa_DC |   .1459287   .0207454     7.03   0.000     .1052574    .1865999 
   D_msa_DEN |  -.3186192   .0169631   -18.78   0.000    -.3518753   -.2853632 
   D_msa_EBY |  -.0700348   .0192869    -3.63   0.000    -.1078466    -.032223 
    D_msa_LA |   .1324162   .0160916     8.23   0.000     .1008686    .1639638 
   D_msa_NYC |   .4198585   .0312241    13.45   0.000     .3586438    .4810732 
    D_msa_OC |  -.0151306   .0165854    -0.91   0.362    -.0476461     .017385 
   D_msa_POR |   -.206542   .0156834   -13.17   0.000    -.2372892   -.1757947 
   D_msa_SAC |   .0267556   .0184158     1.45   0.146    -.0093485    .0628598 
    D_msa_SD |   .1872266   .0236757     7.91   0.000     .1408105    .2336428 
   D_msa_SEA |  -.1291022    .014491    -8.91   0.000    -.1575118   -.1006927 
    D_msa_SF |   .1393787   .0145535     9.58   0.000     .1108466    .1679107 
    D_msa_SJ |  -.0486484   .0146296    -3.33   0.001    -.0773297   -.0199672 
   D_msa_STM |   .1601474   .0263255     6.08   0.000     .1085363    .2117584 
 D_year_2001 |   .0867917   .0156724     5.54   0.000     .0560659    .1175174 
 D_year_2002 |   .0294239   .0094637     3.11   0.002     .0108703    .0479775 
 D_year_2003 |  -.0311553   .0094019    -3.31   0.001    -.0495877   -.0127229 
 D_year_2004 |  -.0288635   .0091898    -3.14   0.002      -.04688    -.010847 
 lag_vacancy |  -.0130558   .0010373   -12.59   0.000    -.0150895   -.0110222 
 D_exp_BS_YR |  -.0410976   .0093904    -4.38   0.000    -.0595074   -.0226878 
 D_exp_GROSS |  -.0764983   .0128558    -5.95   0.000     -.101702   -.0512946 
    D_ti_0-1 |   .0165592   .0113391     1.46   0.144    -.0056712    .0387895 
    D_ti_1-5 |   .0177483   .0091511     1.94   0.053    -.0001923     .035689 
      D_ti>5 |   .0488848   .0108402     4.51   0.000     .0276327    .0701369 
    D_lc_0-1 |  -.0215714   .0116401    -1.85   0.064    -.0443918    .0012491 
    D_lc_1-2 |   .0131398   .0106797     1.23   0.219    -.0077977    .0340773 
      D_lc>2 |   .1592023   .0141078    11.28   0.000      .131544    .1868607 
 D_opt_renew |   .0074022   .0069661     1.06   0.288    -.0062548    .0210592 
 D_opt_trmnt |  -.0370504   .0088704    -4.18   0.000    -.0544407   -.0196601 
   D_opt_rof |  -.0258659    .009323    -2.77   0.006    -.0441435   -.0075882 
       _cons |   3.205863   .0286071   112.07   0.000     3.149779    3.261947 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 36: Model #2 (Lease Term and Option Interactions) 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    4494 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 51,  4442) =  107.71 
       Model |  210.403526    51  4.12555933           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  170.136941  4442  .038301878           R-squared     =  0.5529 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5478 
       Total |  380.540467  4493  .084696298           Root MSE      =  .19571 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    log_rent |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  lease_sqft |   5.97e-07   4.14e-07     1.44   0.150    -2.15e-07    1.41e-06 
  lease_prop |  -.0046823   .0006585    -7.11   0.000    -.0059733   -.0033913 
       D_cbd |   .0305811   .0106017     2.88   0.004     .0097966    .0513657 
   D_class_A |   .1698229   .0083476    20.34   0.000     .1534574    .1861883 
     D_age_2 |    .128435   .0295417     4.35   0.000     .0705187    .1863514 
  D_age_3_15 |   .0121893   .0124701     0.98   0.328    -.0122583    .0366369 
 D_age_16_30 |   .0110965   .0108888     1.02   0.308     -.010251    .0324439 
   D_msa_ATL |  -.2358056   .0184717   -12.77   0.000    -.2720192   -.1995919 
   D_msa_BOS |   .1302783   .0159638     8.16   0.000     .0989813    .1615754 
    D_msa_DC |   .1374696   .0206366     6.66   0.000     .0970115    .1779277 
   D_msa_DEN |  -.3145439   .0169566   -18.55   0.000    -.3477873   -.2813005 
   D_msa_EBY |  -.0769147    .019254    -3.99   0.000    -.1146621   -.0391673 
    D_msa_LA |    .125036   .0160735     7.78   0.000     .0935238    .1565481 
   D_msa_NYC |   .4077524   .0311229    13.10   0.000     .3467361    .4687688 
    D_msa_OC |  -.0233208    .016437    -1.42   0.156    -.0555456    .0089039 
   D_msa_POR |  -.2078786   .0156536   -13.28   0.000    -.2385674   -.1771898 
   D_msa_SAC |   .0166466   .0184208     0.90   0.366    -.0194673    .0527605 
    D_msa_SD |   .1777115   .0236379     7.52   0.000     .1313695    .2240535 
   D_msa_SEA |  -.1350225   .0144084    -9.37   0.000    -.1632701   -.1067748 
    D_msa_SF |    .142026   .0145218     9.78   0.000     .1135559     .170496 
    D_msa_SJ |  -.0551025   .0145955    -3.78   0.000    -.0837169    -.026488 
   D_msa_STM |   .1522997   .0263615     5.78   0.000      .100618    .2039815 
 lag_vacancy |   -.014352   .0009598   -14.95   0.000    -.0162337   -.0124703 
 D_exp_BS_YR |  -.0427392   .0093534    -4.57   0.000    -.0610765   -.0244018 
 D_exp_GROSS |  -.0787225   .0128025    -6.15   0.000    -.1038218   -.0536232 
    D_ti_0_1 |    .016732   .0113111     1.48   0.139    -.0054433    .0389074 
    D_ti_1_5 |   .0195299   .0089945     2.17   0.030     .0018961    .0371636 
      D_ti_5 |   .0511583   .0106047     4.82   0.000     .0303677    .0719489 
    D_lc_0_1 |  -.0180718   .0115366    -1.57   0.117    -.0406893    .0045456 
    D_lc_1_2 |   .0170894   .0105019     1.63   0.104    -.0034997    .0376784 
      D_lc_2 |   .1643346    .013935    11.79   0.000     .1370151     .191654 
   I_term_01 |   .0028568   .0003148     9.08   0.000     .0022397     .003474 
   I_term_02 |   .0021738   .0002033    10.69   0.000     .0017753    .0025723 
   I_term_03 |   .0011185   .0001987     5.63   0.000      .000729    .0015081 
   I_term_04 |    .001124   .0001966     5.72   0.000     .0007386    .0015093 
   I_term_05 |   .0013838   .0001969     7.03   0.000     .0009978    .0017698 
I_opt_rnw_01 |  -.0205743   .0302615    -0.68   0.497    -.0799019    .0387533 
I_opt_rnw_02 |  -.0017345   .0155979    -0.11   0.911    -.0323142    .0288452 
I_opt_rnw_03 |  -.0170177    .013715    -1.24   0.215    -.0439059    .0098705 
I_opt_rnw_04 |   .0087634   .0128735     0.68   0.496    -.0164751     .034002 
I_opt_rnw_05 |   .0391225   .0129549     3.02   0.003     .0137244    .0645206 
I_opt_trm_01 |  -.0519247   .0460795    -1.13   0.260    -.1422634     .038414 
I_opt_trm_02 |  -.0356426    .021004    -1.70   0.090     -.076821    .0055357 
I_opt_trm_03 |  -.0127666   .0167633    -0.76   0.446    -.0456311    .0200979 
I_opt_trm_04 |  -.0266316    .016625    -1.60   0.109    -.0592248    .0059617 
I_opt_trm_05 |  -.0712944   .0182369    -3.91   0.000    -.1070477    -.035541 
I_opt_rof_01 |   .0003653   .0391227     0.01   0.993    -.0763348    .0770653 
I_opt_rof_02 |  -.0591464   .0210942    -2.80   0.005    -.1005016   -.0177913 
I_opt_rof_03 |  -.0080626   .0180662    -0.45   0.655    -.0434814    .0273561 
I_opt_rof_04 |  -.0260556   .0180511    -1.44   0.149    -.0614447    .0093335 
I_opt_rof_05 |  -.0214721   .0179449    -1.20   0.232     -.056653    .0137088 
       _cons |   3.236143   .0267951   120.77   0.000     3.183611    3.288675 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 37: Model #3 (Option Interactions) 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    4494 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 48,  4445) =  112.56 
       Model |  208.779203    48  4.34956673           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  171.761263  4445  .038641454           R-squared     =  0.5486 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5438 
       Total |  380.540467  4493  .084696298           Root MSE      =  .19657 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    log_rent |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 term_in_mos |   .0021912    .000387     5.66   0.000     .0014325    .0029499 
   term_sqrd |  -5.25e-06   2.77e-06    -1.90   0.058    -.0000107    1.74e-07 
  lease_sqft |   7.60e-07   4.33e-07     1.75   0.080    -8.98e-08    1.61e-06 
  lease_prop |  -.0047626   .0006653    -7.16   0.000     -.006067   -.0034582 
       D_cbd |   .0143948   .0103489     1.39   0.164    -.0058942    .0346839 
   D_class_A |   .1726103   .0083621    20.64   0.000     .1562163    .1890042 
     D_age_2 |   .1277939   .0296226     4.31   0.000     .0697189    .1858689 
  D_age_3_15 |   .0164308    .012498     1.31   0.189    -.0080715    .0409331 
 D_age_16_30 |   .0075971   .0109287     0.70   0.487    -.0138286    .0290228 
   D_msa_ATL |  -.2295034   .0185235   -12.39   0.000    -.2658187   -.1931881 
   D_msa_BOS |   .1257462   .0160075     7.86   0.000     .0943634    .1571289 
    D_msa_DC |   .1199352   .0205399     5.84   0.000     .0796667    .1602036 
   D_msa_DEN |  -.3097643   .0170108   -18.21   0.000     -.343114   -.2764147 
   D_msa_EBY |  -.0843454   .0192872    -4.37   0.000    -.1221579   -.0465328 
    D_msa_LA |   .1173315   .0160843     7.29   0.000     .0857983    .1488646 
   D_msa_NYC |   .3987896   .0313301    12.73   0.000     .3373671    .4602121 
    D_msa_OC |  -.0363501    .016348    -2.22   0.026    -.0684002   -.0042999 
   D_msa_POR |  -.2132899    .015686   -13.60   0.000    -.2440423   -.1825374 
   D_msa_SAC |   .0069094   .0183984     0.38   0.707    -.0291606    .0429793 
    D_msa_SD |   .1635379   .0236268     6.92   0.000     .1172177    .2098582 
   D_msa_SEA |  -.1460319   .0143604   -10.17   0.000    -.1741856   -.1178783 
    D_msa_SF |   .1518098   .0145094    10.46   0.000     .1233641    .1802555 
    D_msa_SJ |  -.0623007   .0145928    -4.27   0.000    -.0909098   -.0336916 
   D_msa_STM |   .1462447   .0264674     5.53   0.000     .0943554     .198134 
 lag_vacancy |  -.0169129   .0008705   -19.43   0.000    -.0186195   -.0152064 
 D_exp_BS_YR |  -.0493785   .0093291    -5.29   0.000    -.0676682   -.0310888 
 D_exp_GROSS |  -.0846113   .0126984    -6.66   0.000    -.1095066    -.059716 
    D_ti_0_1 |   .0186868   .0114063     1.64   0.101    -.0036752    .0410488 
    D_ti_1_5 |   .0161185   .0091793     1.76   0.079    -.0018774    .0341144 
      D_ti_5 |   .0448703   .0108233     4.15   0.000     .0236512    .0660895 
    D_lc_0_1 |  -.0144201   .0115116    -1.25   0.210    -.0369886    .0081484 
    D_lc_1_2 |    .020819   .0104984     1.98   0.047     .0002369     .041401 
      D_lc_2 |   .1711938   .0138887    12.33   0.000     .1439651    .1984225 
I_opt_rnw_01 |   .0307257   .0275936     1.11   0.266    -.0233716    .0848229 
I_opt_rnw_02 |   .0260382   .0139274     1.87   0.062    -.0012665    .0533428 
I_opt_rnw_03 |  -.0354698   .0120379    -2.95   0.003    -.0590701   -.0118695 
I_opt_rnw_04 |  -.0071323    .011243    -0.63   0.526    -.0291743    .0149096 
I_opt_rnw_05 |   .0296435   .0113389     2.61   0.009     .0074136    .0518733 
I_opt_trm_01 |  -.0078395   .0453187    -0.17   0.863    -.0966867    .0810078 
I_opt_trm_02 |  -.0236566   .0208923    -1.13   0.258    -.0646159    .0173026 
I_opt_trm_03 |  -.0241108   .0163586    -1.47   0.141    -.0561818    .0079601 
I_opt_trm_04 |   -.037223   .0162674    -2.29   0.022    -.0691153   -.0053307 
I_opt_trm_05 |   -.076116   .0179012    -4.25   0.000    -.1112113   -.0410208 
I_opt_rof_01 |   .0192858   .0390779     0.49   0.622    -.0573264    .0958981 
I_opt_rof_02 |  -.0424094    .020857    -2.03   0.042    -.0832995   -.0015193 
I_opt_rof_03 |   -.014206   .0179319    -0.79   0.428    -.0493614    .0209494 
I_opt_rof_04 |  -.0349825   .0177753    -1.97   0.049     -.069831    -.000134 
I_opt_rof_05 |  -.0234544    .017681    -1.33   0.185     -.058118    .0112092 
       _cons |   3.275016   .0265661   123.28   0.000     3.222933    3.327099 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Summary of Results 
The following is a bullet-point summary of the results discussed above: 
• There is a consistent, upward-sloping, convex term structure of rent. 
• There is an insignificant “size premium” but the “proportion discount” is significant. 
• As expected, CBD and class A leases include rent premiums.  The class A premium is 
very large (16.7%). 
• New buildings generate significant rent premiums.  Rents in the other age groups were 
not significantly different than rents in the over 30 age group. 
• There is a considerable difference across MSAs.  The results show a range of rent 
premium/discount from +50% to -30% of the omitted MSA (Chicago). 
• Each of the lease negotiation years was significantly different from the omitted year 
(2005). 
• The expense type dummy variables are significant, but the results may be misleading.  
A different specification of the dependent variable, without the adjustment for 
operating expenses and taxes, might be an improvement. 
• TIs and LCs do not have a predictable impact on rent at low levels.  But high levels of 
TIs and LCs result in significant rent premiums. 
• Renewal options appear to have positive impacts in some years and negative impacts in 
other years. 
• Termination options and rights of first offer/refusal appear to have negative impacts on 
rent that are somewhat consistent in all years. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
Final Analysis 
The regression model presented in this paper is an interesting start.  These results give some 
answers about the value of contractual terms in office leases, but some questions are left 
unanswered. 
There is a consistent, upward-sloping, convex term structure of rent.  This term structure may 
be the result of increasing rent expectations shared by landlord and tenants.  These expectations 
may be reasonable, given the fact that 2001-2005 is considered to be a relatively weak period in 
the office leasing market.  The negative coefficient for term squared reflects the fact that the 
parties do not expect rent levels to increase forever.  The results of this study with respect to term 
structure can be compared to Gunnelin and Soderberg (2003), which includes data from a 
complete boom-and-bust real estate cycle. 
There is an insignificant “size premium” but the “proportion discount” is significant.  The 
“proportion discount” may be the result of operating efficiencies that emerge when buildings are 
leased to a few large tenants as opposed to many small tenants.  Notably, in earlier versions of 
the model, the size premium was significant, but when the lease proportion variable was added, 
the impact of lease square feet was greatly diminished.  These results support the idea that the 
operating efficiencies, not the absolute size of the leased space, generate the discount. 
As expected, CBD and class A leases include rent premiums.  The class A premium is very 
large (16.7%).  This result suggests that quality is more important than location.  Both the 
CBD/suburban and class variables can probably be improved.  Better controls for quality and 
location would make a better predictive model, as discussed in the next section. 
New buildings generate significant rent premiums.  This is consistent with the results of 
Wheaton and Torto (1994).  Rents in the other age groups were not significantly different than 
rents in the over 30 age group.  The most likely explanation of this result is that older buildings 
with recent renovations and other capital improvements are the same as newer buildings.  
Unfortunately, the model does not control for renovations and other capital improvements. 
There is a considerable difference across MSAs.  The results show a range of rent 
premium/discount from +50% to -30% of the omitted MSA (Chicago).  Each of the lease 
negotiation years was significantly different from the omitted year (2005).  Although the lagged 
vacancy variable has a large impact on rent and is highly significant, the MSA and year variables 
continue to have significant impacts as well.  This result shows that lagged vacancy explains 
much but not all variation due to market conditions across MSAs and years. 
The expense type dummy variables are significant, but the results may be misleading.  In this 
study, the dependent variable includes an estimate of operating expenses and taxes.  Therefore, 
as adjusted, net rents should be the same as gross rents and base year rents.  A simple 
explanation might be that operating expenses and taxes were overestimated for net leases and/or 
underestimated for gross leases.  Alternatively, an analysis of expense types across markets or 
tenant types might reveal that the different expense types represent external conditions which are 
responsible for the impact on rents.  For example, perhaps net leases are negotiated only in 
strong markets or only with high-rent tenants.  Neither one of these explanations is entirely 
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satisfying.  A different specification of the dependent variable, without the adjustment for 
operating expenses and taxes, might be an improvement. 
TIs and LCs do not have a predictable impact on rent at low levels.  But high levels of TIs and 
LCs result in significant rent premiums.  These results appear to make sense.  Low levels of TIs 
and LCs may be expected by the market.  Therefore, at lower levels, the small impact on rent 
may be eclipsed by other factors not present in this model.  At higher levels, however, the impact 
of both terms shines through, as these contractual provisions are clearly priced into rent levels.  
The impact of high leasing commissions appears to be especially strong.  One possible 
explanation might be that higher leasing commissions are correlated with the involvement of 
tenant rep brokers, which may indicate an increased amount of size or sophistication on behalf of 
the transaction or the tenant. 
Renewal options appear to have positive impacts in some years and negative impacts in other 
years.  One explanation is that renewal options may not affect rent levels because these options 
generally specify that the renewal rent is “fair market rent” or “prevailing market rent.”  
Essentially, these options have little to no value, and landlords may be willing to grant renewal 
options without significant compensation.  Alternatively, renewal options may represent 
amenities that are granted to tenants as inducements in weaker leasing markets but are priced in 
stronger markets.  In fact, the renewal option interaction terms support this theory, with positive 
coefficients in the relatively strong years of 2001, 2002, and 2005, and negative coefficients in 
the weaker years of 2003 and 2004. 
Termination options and rights of first offer/refusal appear to have negative impacts on rent 
that are somewhat consistent in all years.  Unlike renewal options, termination options and rights 
of first offer/refusal represent contractual terms that are priced in strong and weak markets.  
Somewhat surprisingly, however, these option types result in rent discounts.  This is 
counterintuitive because these options are thought to benefit the tenant.  One explanation is that 
these options are in fact beneficial to the landlord.  Termination options are sometimes mutual, 
and often they specify termination fees that may be in excess of what the landlord expects to be 
able to negotiate ex post without the option.  And rights of first offer/refusal might indicate that 
the tenant is likely to expand and lease additional space from the landlord.  Moreover, both types 
of options represent some amount of pre-negotiation and information exchange that might be 
valuable to the landlord. 
Further study is necessary to understand the value of these options.  Overall, more information 
about options terms would be beneficial.  Information such as the renewal rent, the termination 
fee, and the size of the offer/refusal space would help us to understand the economic 
arrangement between the parties and to predict the corresponding impact on rent. 
Further Study 
The regression model presented in this paper could be improved in several different ways.  The 
CBD dummy variable is flawed in that the CBD in Boston may be very different from the CBD 
in Atlanta.  Other location variables such as submarkets, employment within one mile, or 
distance from CBD center, could improve the model.  In many of the prior studies, specific 
location factors are very important determinants of rent levels.  See Ryan (2005); Bollinger et al. 
(1998); Colwell et al. (1998). 
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Also, more qualitative factors about the building or the leased space, such as design factors or 
retail amenities, could be added.  These factors are presumably represented by the class variable, 
which may be too subjective and too dependent on other factors, such as location or age.  
Furthermore, the class variable is a very rigid measure, with only two possible values (A/B).  
Additional quality variables with more degrees of freedom could improve the performance of the 
regression model.  Other studies have included such variables with a certain amount of success.  
See Bollinger et al. (1998); Mills (1992); Brennan et al. (1984). 
Likewise, the age variable may be an imperfect solution, as indicated by the lack of any 
significant difference among non-new age groups.  In order to address this problem, a renovation 
variable could be interacted with the age group dummy variables.  This technique was used 
successfully by Asser (2004).  Unfortunately, complete renovation data was not available with 
respect the working data set used in this paper. 
Industry classification of the tenant could be included.  This factor could have a large impact 
on rent.  For example, certain industries may be favored by landlords because they are 
considered to be growth industries, or stable industries.  Perhaps more to the point, tenant 
creditworthiness could be included as well.  Including tenant characteristics would perhaps be 
the most interesting addition to the regression model. 
Other techniques, such as conducting multiple regressions by market could reveal trends that 
are not apparent from the single regression run used in this paper.  For example, different 
contractual terms may be priced differently in each market. 
Finally, a study of these variables using a data set that includes a greater number of years could 
yield results that are more robust.  The relatively short five-year time period is a factor that 
constrains the general applicability of the regression model presented in this paper. 
 41
Bibliography 
Rebecca Asser. “The Determinants of Office Tenant Renewal.” MSRED thesis. Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 2004. 
John D. Benjamin, J. Sa-Aadu, James D. Shilling. “Influence of rent differentials on the choice 
between office rent contracts with and without relocation provisions.” Journal of the American 
Real Estate and Urban Economics Association 20.2 (1992): 289-302. 
Christopher R. Bollinger, Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, David R. Bowes. “Spatial variation in office rents 
within the Atlanta region.” Urban Studies 35.7 (1998): 1097-1118. 
Thomas P. Brennan, Roger E. Cannaday, Peter F. Colwell. “Office Rent in the Chicago CBD.” 
AREUEA Journal 12.3 (1984): 243-260. 
Peter F. Colwell, Henry J. Munneke, Joseph W. Trefzger. “Chicago's office market: Price 
indices, location and time.” Real Estate Economics 26.1 (1998):  83-106. 
Neil Dunse, Colin Jones. “A hedonic price model of office rents.” Journal of Property Valuation 
& Investment 16.3 (1998): 297. 
Lynn M. Fisher. “The Wealth Effects of Sale and Leasebacks: New Evidence.” Real Estate 
Economics 32.4 (2004): 619-643. 
John L. Glascock, Shirin Jahanian, C. F. Sirmans. “An Analysis of Office Market Rents: Some 
Empirical Evidence.” AREUEA Journal 18.1 (1990): 105-119. 
Steven R. Grenadier. “Valuing Lease Contracts: A Real-Options Approach.” Journal of Financial 
Economics 38 (1995): 297-331. 
Ake Gunnelin, Bo Soderberg. “Term Structures in the Office Rental Market in Stockholm.” 
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 26.2/3 (2003): 241-265. 
Edwin S. Mills. “Office rent determinants in the Chicago area.” Journal of the American Real 
Estate and Urban Economics Association 20.1 (1992): 273-287. 
Sherry Ryan. “The Value of Access to Highways and Light Rail Transit: Evidence for Industrial 
and Office Firms.” Urban Studies 42.4 (2005): 751-764. 
William C. Wheaton, Raymond G. Torto. “Office Rent Indices and Their Behavior over Time.” 
Journal of Urban Economics 35 (1994): 121-139. 
 
 42
Appendix: Correlation Matrix 
             | log_rent term_i~s term_s~d lease_~t lease_~p bldg_s~t bldg_f~s    D_cbd D_clas~A  D_age_2 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    log_rent |   1.0000 
 term_in_mos |   0.2006   1.0000 
   term_sqrd |   0.1973   0.9496   1.0000 
  lease_sqft |   0.0678   0.4502   0.5124   1.0000 
  lease_prop |  -0.0735   0.2505   0.2583   0.6221   1.0000 
   bldg_sqft |   0.1837   0.1714   0.1881   0.1262  -0.2391   1.0000 
 bldg_floors |   0.2262   0.1591   0.1713   0.0836  -0.2359   0.8740   1.0000 
       D_cbd |   0.2699   0.1812   0.2033   0.0727  -0.1441   0.5968   0.7115   1.0000 
   D_class_A |   0.2564   0.1112   0.0897   0.0164  -0.0734   0.0390   0.0336  -0.0437   1.0000 
     D_age_2 |   0.0805   0.0884   0.0768   0.0681   0.0770  -0.0503  -0.0658   0.0168   0.0564   1.0000 
  D_age_3_15 |   0.0727   0.0633   0.0497   0.0302  -0.0151   0.0484  -0.0095  -0.0444   0.2259  -0.0609 
 D_age_16_30 |  -0.1107  -0.0849  -0.0870  -0.0727  -0.0021  -0.0888  -0.0787  -0.1013  -0.0969  -0.1546 
   D_msa_ATL |  -0.2003   0.0418   0.0433   0.0411   0.0239  -0.0052  -0.0011  -0.0883   0.0380  -0.0134 
   D_msa_BOS |   0.1569   0.0979   0.1070   0.0587   0.0497  -0.0178  -0.0143   0.1923  -0.0077  -0.0303 
    D_msa_DC |   0.1495   0.1164   0.1111   0.0927   0.0346  -0.0438  -0.0423   0.0552  -0.0240  -0.0209 
   D_msa_DEN |  -0.2390  -0.0163  -0.0290  -0.0084  -0.0299   0.0182   0.0629   0.1400  -0.1048  -0.0242 
   D_msa_EBY |  -0.0437  -0.0184  -0.0328  -0.0261  -0.0329  -0.0589  -0.0886  -0.1177   0.1053  -0.0135 
    D_msa_LA |   0.1749   0.0028   0.0044   0.0114   0.0190   0.0244   0.0424  -0.0428   0.0648  -0.0309 
   D_msa_NYC |   0.2772   0.1256   0.1684   0.1199   0.0019   0.0386   0.1405   0.1945   0.0549  -0.0123 
    D_msa_OC |  -0.0276  -0.1138  -0.1067  -0.0398  -0.0341  -0.0805  -0.0975  -0.1813  -0.0351  -0.0363 
   D_msa_POR |  -0.2196  -0.0222  -0.0431  -0.0419   0.0078  -0.1615  -0.1581  -0.0736   0.0768   0.0186 
   D_msa_SAC |   0.0163  -0.0278  -0.0413  -0.0652   0.0092  -0.1489  -0.1614  -0.0844  -0.0451   0.1366 
    D_msa_SD |   0.0981  -0.0445  -0.0426  -0.0191  -0.0035  -0.0700  -0.0479  -0.0843   0.0376  -0.0169 
   D_msa_SEA |  -0.1024   0.0365   0.0314   0.0214  -0.0118   0.1643   0.2095  -0.0108   0.0253  -0.0299 
    D_msa_SF |   0.1469  -0.0167  -0.0190  -0.0087   0.0174  -0.0018  -0.0107   0.0938   0.1208   0.1163 
    D_msa_SJ |  -0.0914  -0.1308  -0.1121  -0.0405   0.0629  -0.1790  -0.1882  -0.1745  -0.1628  -0.0177 
   D_msa_STM |   0.1132   0.0137   0.0061   0.0173  -0.0018  -0.0382  -0.0138  -0.0737   0.0659  -0.0147 
 D_year_2001 |   0.1897   0.0024   0.0032   0.0301  -0.0080   0.0999   0.1158   0.1175  -0.0045   0.0294 
 D_year_2002 |   0.0624  -0.0208  -0.0286  -0.0054   0.0178  -0.0301  -0.0463  -0.0465  -0.0241  -0.0133 
 D_year_2003 |  -0.1048  -0.0044   0.0043  -0.0111  -0.0117  -0.0051  -0.0205  -0.0147   0.0219   0.0759 
 D_year_2004 |  -0.0966   0.0129   0.0227   0.0128  -0.0082  -0.0040  -0.0081  -0.0230  -0.0140  -0.0215 
     vacancy |  -0.2305  -0.0666  -0.0881  -0.0586   0.0381  -0.1760  -0.2718  -0.3914   0.1549   0.0688 
 lag_vacancy |  -0.3343  -0.0770  -0.0970  -0.0669   0.0408  -0.2242  -0.3114  -0.4566   0.1760   0.0236 
 D_exp_BS_YR |   0.1029   0.0105  -0.0029   0.0343   0.0141  -0.1528  -0.0815  -0.0922   0.1201   0.0476 
 D_exp_GROSS |  -0.0605  -0.0319  -0.0138  -0.0395  -0.0259   0.1019   0.0011   0.0144   0.0077  -0.0301 
    D_ti_0_1 |  -0.0188  -0.0866  -0.0806  -0.0736  -0.0374  -0.0571  -0.0520  -0.0498  -0.0095  -0.0167 
    D_ti_1_5 |  -0.0511   0.2244   0.1732   0.0524   0.0685  -0.0435  -0.0306  -0.0657  -0.0210  -0.0494 
      D_ti_5 |   0.1373   0.0645   0.0290   0.0455   0.0101   0.0789   0.0554   0.0863   0.0850   0.0814 
    D_lc_0_1 |  -0.1272   0.0760   0.1033   0.0894   0.0499   0.0383   0.0018   0.0006  -0.0562  -0.0377 
    D_lc_1_2 |  -0.0022   0.0678   0.0076  -0.0143   0.0011   0.0147   0.0107   0.0054   0.0168  -0.0089 
      D_lc_2 |   0.2339  -0.0860  -0.0723  -0.0494  -0.0330  -0.0553   0.0040  -0.0050   0.0451   0.0289 
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 D_opt_renew |   0.0688   0.3571   0.3126   0.2455   0.2147  -0.0255  -0.0471  -0.0692   0.0956   0.0828 
 D_opt_trmnt |  -0.0432   0.2518   0.2310   0.0832   0.0420   0.0990   0.0720   0.0524   0.0502   0.0166 
   D_opt_rof |  -0.0042   0.3744   0.3787   0.3319   0.2359   0.1023   0.0849   0.0615   0.0601   0.0402 
 
             | D_age~15 D_age~30 D_msa_~L D_msa_~S D_msa_DC D_msa_~N D_msa_~Y D_msa_LA D_msa~YC D_msa_OC 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  D_age_3_15 |   1.0000 
 D_age_16_30 |  -0.7457   1.0000 
   D_msa_ATL |   0.0573  -0.0618   1.0000 
   D_msa_BOS |  -0.0554  -0.1295  -0.0562   1.0000 
    D_msa_DC |   0.0265   0.0022  -0.0387  -0.0501   1.0000 
   D_msa_DEN |  -0.1037   0.1428  -0.0449  -0.0581  -0.0400   1.0000 
   D_msa_EBY |  -0.0394   0.0520  -0.0437  -0.0565  -0.0389  -0.0451   1.0000 
    D_msa_LA |   0.0831  -0.0995  -0.0574  -0.0743  -0.0512  -0.0593  -0.0577   1.0000 
   D_msa_NYC |  -0.0543   0.0230  -0.0228  -0.0295  -0.0203  -0.0235  -0.0229  -0.0301   1.0000 
    D_msa_OC |   0.1304  -0.0664  -0.0673  -0.0871  -0.0600  -0.0695  -0.0676  -0.0889  -0.0353   1.0000 
   D_msa_POR |   0.0593  -0.0079  -0.0615  -0.0796  -0.0548  -0.0635  -0.0618  -0.0813  -0.0322  -0.0952 
   D_msa_SAC |   0.1584  -0.1403  -0.0487  -0.0631  -0.0435  -0.0503  -0.0490  -0.0644  -0.0255  -0.0755 
    D_msa_SD |   0.0092   0.0294  -0.0313  -0.0405  -0.0279  -0.0323  -0.0314  -0.0413  -0.0164  -0.0484 
   D_msa_SEA |  -0.0657   0.1362  -0.0681  -0.0882  -0.0608  -0.0704  -0.0685  -0.0901  -0.0357  -0.1055 
    D_msa_SF |  -0.0595   0.0357  -0.0753  -0.0975  -0.0671  -0.0778  -0.0757  -0.0995  -0.0395  -0.1166 
    D_msa_SJ |  -0.1534   0.1504  -0.0699  -0.0905  -0.0623  -0.0722  -0.0702  -0.0923  -0.0366  -0.1082 
   D_msa_STM |  -0.0093   0.0409  -0.0273  -0.0354  -0.0244  -0.0282  -0.0275  -0.0361  -0.0143  -0.0423 
 D_year_2001 |   0.1277  -0.1067   0.0159  -0.0032  -0.0014   0.0839  -0.0400   0.0591   0.0404   0.0024 
 D_year_2002 |   0.0952  -0.0466   0.0080  -0.0146  -0.0254   0.0011  -0.0422  -0.0069  -0.0257   0.0270 
 D_year_2003 |  -0.0097   0.0125  -0.0254  -0.0118  -0.0310   0.0056   0.0456  -0.0256  -0.0143   0.0197 
 D_year_2004 |  -0.0506   0.0331   0.0222   0.0245   0.0218  -0.0488   0.0338  -0.0061   0.0150  -0.0196 
     vacancy |   0.0762  -0.0235   0.1730  -0.0959  -0.2069   0.0685   0.0487  -0.1184  -0.2004  -0.2402 
 lag_vacancy |   0.0194   0.0236   0.1423  -0.1257  -0.1981   0.0121   0.0406  -0.0773  -0.1979  -0.1311 
 D_exp_BS_YR |   0.0120  -0.0818   0.0510   0.1013   0.0754  -0.1982   0.1305   0.0435   0.0711   0.1758 
 D_exp_GROSS |  -0.0003  -0.0347   0.0708  -0.0020   0.0185  -0.0232  -0.0501  -0.0083  -0.0289  -0.0314 
    D_ti_0_1 |   0.0309  -0.0116  -0.0288  -0.0505  -0.0265   0.0206  -0.0397  -0.0213  -0.0276   0.0146 
    D_ti_1_5 |   0.0397  -0.0074   0.0612  -0.0623   0.0078   0.0203  -0.0278  -0.0091  -0.0074   0.0253 
      D_ti_5 |  -0.0346  -0.0156  -0.0815   0.1280   0.0047  -0.0238   0.1211   0.0198   0.0068  -0.0606 
    D_lc_0_1 |  -0.0177  -0.0057  -0.0076   0.1456  -0.0309   0.0713  -0.0169  -0.0745  -0.0305   0.0245 
    D_lc_1_2 |   0.0575  -0.0019  -0.0147  -0.0705   0.0370  -0.0075   0.0411   0.0540  -0.0854   0.0111 
      D_lc_2 |  -0.0371   0.0138   0.0004  -0.0816  -0.0212  -0.0650  -0.0298   0.0288   0.1822  -0.0779 
 D_opt_renew |   0.0681  -0.0399   0.0026   0.0276   0.0233  -0.0525   0.0565   0.0740   0.0033  -0.0254 
 D_opt_trmnt |   0.0267  -0.0156  -0.0032   0.0100   0.0012  -0.0023  -0.0072  -0.0168  -0.0156  -0.0698 
   D_opt_rof |   0.0379  -0.0281   0.0578   0.0205   0.0089   0.0267  -0.0106   0.0229  -0.0015  -0.0590 
 
             | D_msa_~R D_msa~AC D_msa_SD D_msa~EA D_msa_SF D_msa_SJ D_msa_~M D_y~2001 D_y~2002 D_y~2003 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   D_msa_POR |   1.0000 
   D_msa_SAC |  -0.0690   1.0000 
    D_msa_SD |  -0.0443  -0.0351   1.0000 
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   D_msa_SEA |  -0.0965  -0.0765  -0.0491   1.0000 
    D_msa_SF |  -0.1066  -0.0845  -0.0542  -0.1181   1.0000 
    D_msa_SJ |  -0.0989  -0.0784  -0.0503  -0.1096  -0.1211   1.0000 
   D_msa_STM |  -0.0387  -0.0307  -0.0197  -0.0429  -0.0474  -0.0440   1.0000 
 D_year_2001 |  -0.0281  -0.0267  -0.0385  -0.0120  -0.0350  -0.0800   0.0451   1.0000 
 D_year_2002 |   0.0540  -0.0091  -0.0026   0.0024  -0.0059   0.0093  -0.0207  -0.1320   1.0000 
 D_year_2003 |   0.0130  -0.0095  -0.0079   0.0099   0.0078   0.0065  -0.0266  -0.1463  -0.2928   1.0000 
 D_year_2004 |  -0.0200   0.0009   0.0139   0.0062  -0.0164   0.0115   0.0062  -0.1455  -0.2912  -0.3227 
     vacancy |   0.1047  -0.0059  -0.0459  -0.1486   0.2955   0.0941  -0.0000  -0.0966   0.2729   0.2366 
 lag_vacancy |   0.0569  -0.0219  -0.0114  -0.1239   0.3345   0.1054  -0.0289  -0.4115  -0.0838   0.2259 
 D_exp_BS_YR |   0.1303   0.1186   0.0745  -0.1317   0.1127  -0.2136   0.0611  -0.0497  -0.0698   0.0207 
 D_exp_GROSS |  -0.0388  -0.0090  -0.0134  -0.0361  -0.0340  -0.0078   0.0036  -0.0157  -0.0763  -0.0996 
    D_ti_0_1 |  -0.0179   0.0714   0.0194   0.0024  -0.0132   0.0811  -0.0058   0.0504   0.0533   0.0099 
    D_ti_1_5 |   0.1033   0.0245   0.0211   0.0280  -0.0938  -0.0347  -0.0256  -0.0102   0.0299   0.0025 
      D_ti_5 |  -0.0912  -0.0331  -0.0359  -0.0344   0.1200  -0.0693   0.0270  -0.0764  -0.0868   0.0092 
    D_lc_0_1 |   0.0452  -0.0454  -0.0581   0.0762  -0.0732  -0.0913  -0.0373   0.0304   0.0031   0.0060 
    D_lc_1_2 |   0.0116   0.0549   0.0401  -0.0145   0.0008  -0.0583  -0.0443  -0.0128   0.0344   0.0617 
      D_lc_2 |  -0.0391   0.0049   0.0050  -0.0796   0.0221   0.2600   0.0992   0.0335   0.0656   0.0288 
 D_opt_renew |  -0.0389   0.1012  -0.0255  -0.0166  -0.0072  -0.0293   0.0930  -0.0627  -0.0883   0.0064 
 D_opt_trmnt |   0.0373  -0.0218  -0.0358   0.0286  -0.0672  -0.0306   0.0050  -0.0503  -0.0445   0.0412 
   D_opt_rof |  -0.0116  -0.0093  -0.0018   0.0297  -0.0383  -0.0770   0.0387  -0.0137  -0.0369   0.0089 
 
             | D_y~2004  vacancy lag_va~y D_exp_~R D_exp_~S D_ti_0_1 D_ti_1_5   D_ti_5 D_lc_0_1 D_lc_1_2 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 D_year_2004 |   1.0000 
     vacancy |  -0.0872   1.0000 
 lag_vacancy |   0.1860   0.7106   1.0000 
 D_exp_BS_YR |   0.1141  -0.1249  -0.0394   1.0000 
 D_exp_GROSS |  -0.0984  -0.0631  -0.0187  -0.4750   1.0000 
    D_ti_0_1 |  -0.0331   0.0565   0.0041  -0.0164  -0.0516   1.0000 
    D_ti_1_5 |   0.0342   0.0185   0.0183   0.0638  -0.1216  -0.3729   1.0000 
      D_ti_5 |   0.0088  -0.0197   0.0522   0.0634  -0.0334  -0.1749  -0.4795   1.0000 
    D_lc_0_1 |   0.0570   0.0269   0.0013  -0.0339  -0.0308   0.0261  -0.0211  -0.0115   1.0000 
    D_lc_1_2 |  -0.0712  -0.0087  -0.0031   0.1038  -0.1326  -0.0338   0.1581   0.0531  -0.5950   1.0000 
      D_lc_2 |  -0.0591   0.0622  -0.0221  -0.0005  -0.0452   0.0174  -0.0200   0.0070  -0.1715  -0.3899 
 D_opt_renew |   0.0555  -0.0083   0.0674   0.0782  -0.0095  -0.1126   0.1198   0.1146  -0.0497   0.1152 
 D_opt_trmnt |   0.0403   0.0204   0.0378  -0.0573   0.0275  -0.0345   0.0682   0.0292   0.0147   0.0369 
   D_opt_rof |   0.0095  -0.0051   0.0078  -0.0203   0.0307  -0.0773   0.0792   0.0448   0.0236   0.0458 
 
             |   D_lc_2 D_opt_~w D_opt_~t D_opt_~f 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
      D_lc_2 |   1.0000 
 D_opt_renew |  -0.0249   1.0000 
 D_opt_trmnt |  -0.0369   0.1837   1.0000 
   D_opt_rof |  -0.0627   0.3587   0.2142   1.0000 
